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Abstract—After years of development, FPGAs are finally
making an appearance on multi-tenant cloud servers. These
heterogeneous FPGA-CPU architectures break common assump-
tions about isolation and security boundaries. Since the FPGA
and CPU architectures share hardware resources, a new class of
vulnerabilities requires us to reassess the security and depend-
ability of these platforms.
In this work, we analyze the memory and cache subsystem and
study Rowhammer and cache attacks enabled on two proposed
heterogeneous FPGA-CPU platforms by Intel: the Arria 10 GX
with an integrated FPGA-CPU platform, and the Arria 10 GX
PAC expansion card which connects the FPGA to the CPU via
the PCIe interface. We show that while Intel PACs currently are
immune to cache attacks from FPGA to CPU, the integrated
platform is indeed vulnerable to Prime and Probe style attacks
from the FPGA to the CPU’s last level cache. Further, we
demonstrate JackHammer, a novel and efficient Rowhammer
from the FPGA to the host’s main memory. Our results indicate
that a malicious FPGA can perform twice as fast as a typical
Rowhammer attack from the CPU on the same system and
causes around four times as many bit flips as the CPU attack.
We demonstrate the efficacy of JackHammer from the FPGA
through a realistic fault attack on the WolfSSL RSA signing
implementation that reliably causes a fault after an average of
fifty-eight RSA signatures, 25% faster than a CPU rowhammer
attack. In some scenarios our JackHammer attack produces
faulty signatures more than three times more often and almost
three times faster than a conventional CPU rowhammer attack.
Index Terms—FPGA, side-channel, cache attack, Rowhammer,
cloud security
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, as improvements in microprocessor perfor-
mance have slowed, developers have looked to other comput-
ing resources to increase performance. Graphics processing
units (GPUs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs),
and FPGAs have all been adapted to accelerate applications
such as cryptocurrency mining, high-frequency trading, and
in machine learning. FPGAs are particularly interesting for
cloud computing applications, as they can be reconfigured for
the needs of different users at different times without losing
their exceptionally low latency. Amazon Web Services [3] and
Alibaba Cloud [2] already offer FPGA instances with ultra-
high performance Xilinx Virtex UltraScale+ and Intel Arria
10 GX FPGAs to the consumer market. These FPGAs are
designed for high I/O bandwidth and high compute capacity,
making them ideal for server workloads. New Intel FPGAs
offer cache-coherent memory systems for even better perfor-
mance when data is being passed back and forth between CPU
and FPGA.
The flexibility of FPGA systems can also open up new
attack vectors for malicious users in public clouds or more
efficiently exploit existing ones. integrated FPGA platforms
connect the FPGA right into the processor bus interconnect
giving FPGA direct access into cache and memory [25].
Similarly, high-end FPGAs can be integrated into a server as
an accelerator, e.g. connected via PCIe interface [31, 60]. Such
combinations provide unprecedented performance over a high-
throughput and low-latency connection with the versatility of
a reprogrammable FPGA infrastructure shared among cloud
users. However, the tight integration may also expose users to
new threats by malicious users.
This work exposes hardware and micro-architectural vul-
nerabilities in hybrid FPGA-CPU systems with a particular
focus on cloud platforms where the FPGA and the CPU are
in distinct security domains: one potentially a victim and the
other an attacker. We examine Intel’s Arria 10 GX FPGA as an
example of a current generation of FPGA accelerator platform
designed in particular for heavy and/or cloud-based compu-
tation loads. We thoroughly analyze the memory interfaces
between such platforms and their host CPUs. These interfaces,
which allow the CPU and FPGA to interact in various direct
and indirect ways, include hardware on both the FPGA and
CPU, application libraries and software drivers executed by the
CPU, and logical interfaces implemented on the FPGA outside
of but accessible to the user-configurable region. We propose
attacks that exploit practical use cases of these interfaces to
target adjacent systems such as the CPU memory and cache.
A. Our Contributions
We demonstrate novel hardware attacks between the mem-
ory interface of Intel Arria 10 GX platforms and their host
CPUs. Furthermore, we demonstrate a Rowhammer mounted
from the FPGA against the CPU to cause faults in the
WolfSSL RSA signature implementation, and to leak a private
RSA modulus factor. In summary:
– We thoroughly reverse-engineer and analyze the cache
behavior and investigate the viability of cache attacks on
realistic FPGA-CPU hybrid systems.
– Based on our investigation of the cache subsystem,
we build a Rowhammer from the FPGA that bypasses
caching to hammer twice as fast as a CPU can, causing
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faults that the CPU Rowhammer attack is unable to
replicate.
– Our Rowhammer remains stealthy to any monitor on the
CPU since it bypasses the CPU microarchitecture.
– Using both Rowhammer implementations, we demon-
strate a fault attack on the recent versions of WolfCrypt
RSA implementation, part of the WolfSSL Library, and
recover private keys. WolfSSL version 4.3.0 included
protection against the attack after we reported the vul-
nerability in versions up to 4.2.0.
– We demonstrate that the base blinding used in
WolfCrypt’s RSA implementation leaves the algorithm
vulnerable to the Bellcore fault injection attack.
B. Experimental Setup
We analyze two distinct FPGA-CPU platforms with Intel
Arria 10 FPGA: 1) integrated into the CPU package and 2)
Programmable Acceleration Card (PAC).
The integrated Intel Arria 10 is based on a prototype E5-
2600v4 CPU with 12 physical cores. The prototype CPU has
a Broadwell architecture in which the last level cache (LLC)
is inclusive of the L1/L2 caches. The CPU package has an
integrated Arria 10 GX 1150 FPGA running at 400 MHz. All
measurements done on this platform are strictly done from
userspace only, as access is kindly provided by Intel through
their Intel Lab (IL) Academic Compute Environment1. The
IL environment also gives us user-level access to platforms
with two PACs with Arria 10 GX 1150 FPGA installed and
running at 200 MHz. These systems have Intel Xeon Platinum
8180 that comes with non-inclusive LLC. We carried out
the Rowhammer on our local Dell Optiplex 7010 system
with an Intel i7-3770 CPU, and a single DIMM of Sam-
sung M378B5773DH0-CH9 1333 MHz 2 GB DDR3 DRAM
equipped with the same Intel PAC running with a primary
clock speed of 200 MHz2.
The operating system (OS) running in the IL is a 64-bit Red
Hat Enterprise Linux 7 with Kernel version 3.10, and we run
Ubuntu 16.04 on our local test systems. The OPAE version
was compiled and installed on July 15th, 2019 for both, the
FPGA PAC and the integrated FPGA platform. We used Quar-
tus 17.1.1 and Quartus 16.0.0 to synthesize AFUs for the PACs
and integrated FPGAs, respectively. The bitstream version
of the non-user-configurable Board Management Controller
(BMC) firmware is 1.1.3 on the FPGA PAC and 5.0.3 on the
integrated FPGA. The OS on our Optiplex 7010 workstation
is Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS with Linux kernel 4.13.0-36. On this
system, we installed the latest stable release of OPAE, 1.3.0,
and on its FPGA PAC, we installed the compatible 1.1.3 BMC
firmware bitstream.
C. Vulnerability Disclosure
We informed the WolfSSL team of WolfCrypt’s vulnerabil-
ity to Bellcore-style RSA fault injection attacks on November
1https://wiki.intel-research.net/
2The PAC is intended to support 400 MHz clock speed, but the current
version of the Intel Acceleration Stack has a bug that halves the clock speed.
25, 2019. WolfSSL acknowledged the vulnerability on the
same day, and released WolfSSL 4.3.0 with a fix for the
vulnerability on December 20, 2019. MITRE Corporation
published a description of the vulnerability as CVE-2019-
19962 to the National Vulnerability Database on December
24, 2019 [1].
II. BACKGROUND
A. Cache Attacks
Cache attacks have been proposed attacking different ap-
plications [45, 11, 22, 24, 6, 56]. In general, cache attacks
use timing side effects of cache accesses to leak information.
Modern cache systems use a hierarchical architecture that
includes smaller, faster caches and bigger, slower caches. Mea-
suring the latency of a memory access can often confidently
determine which levels of cache contain a certain memory
address (or if the memory is cached at all). Cache subsystems
also support coherency, which ensures that whenever memory
is overwritten in one cache, copies of that memory in other
caches are either updated or invalidated. Cache coherency may
cause side effects in caches, allowing an attacker to learn about
a cache line that is not even directly accessible [34]. Cache
attacks have become a major focus of security research in
cloud computing platforms where users are allocated CPUs,
cores, or virtual machines which, in theory, should offer
perfect isolation, but in practice may leak information to each
other via shared caches [28]. In the following, we give an
introduction to the cache attack techniques used later in this
work.
a) Flush+Reload and Evict+Reload: Flush+Reload
(F+R) [62] gives the attacker information about the victim’s
behavior with cache line granularity. To do so, the attacker
cycles over three steps: 1) The attacker uses the clflush
instruction to flush the cache line that is to be monitored.
After flushing the monitored cache line, 2) she waits for the
victim to execute. Later, 3) she reloads the flushed line and
measures the reload latency. If the latency is low, the cache
line is served from the cache hierarchy. That means, that the
cache line was accessed by the victim during its execution.
If the access latency is high, the cache line was loaded from
main memory, meaning that the victim did not access it during
its execution.
Evict+Reload (E+R) [40] is similar to (F+R). In an E+R
attack, if the system does not have a flush instruction or
disabled its execution from userspace, the attacker can, instead,
evict the desired cache line by accessing cache lines that form
an eviction set during step one. Methods for finding eviction
sets are described later in this section.
F+R can work across cores and even across sockets, as long
as the LLC is coherent, as is the case with many modern multi-
CPU systems. E+R can be used if the attacker shares the same
CPU socket (but not necessarily the same core) as the victim
and if the LLC is inclusive3. If the LLC is non-inclusive the
3A lower-level cache is called inclusive of a higher-level cache if all cache
lines present in the higher-level cache are always present in the lower-level
cache.
2
attacker can attack the inclusive directory structure used to
ensure coherency [61]. These attacks are limited to shared
memory scenarios, where the victim and attacker share data
or instructions, as is the case with shared libraries on systems
where memory de-duplication is enabled.
b) Flush+Flush: Flush+Flush (F+F) [21], similar to
F+R, gives the attacker cache line granularity and consists
of three steps. The only difference is in the third step where
the attacker flushes the cache line again and measures the
execution time of the flush instruction instead of the memory
access. F+F is faster than F+R as the second flush phase
can be used as the first flush for another run. However,
like F+R, F+F is limited to scenarios where there is a flush
instruction available, and the victim and attacker share data or
instructions.
c) Prime+Probe: Prime+Probe (P+P) gives the attacker
a more coarse cache set granularity than the aforementioned
methods since the attacker checks the status of the cache by
probing a whole cache set rather than flushing or reloading
a single line. However, this granularity is sufficient in many
cases [46, 50, 65, 32, 45, 40, 43]. Again there are three steps:
1) The attacker primes the cache set under surveillance with
dummy data by accessing a proper eviction set, 2) she waits for
the victim to execute, 3) she accesses the eviction set again and
measures the access latency (probing). If the latency is above
a certain threshold, some part of the eviction set was evicted
by the victim process, meaning that the victim accessed cache
lines belonging to the cache set under surveillance [42].
Unlike F+R, E+R, and F+F, P+P does not rely on shared
memory. However, the granularity is more coarse-grained,
noisier, works only if the victim is located on the same socket
as the attacker, and relies on inclusive caches. In non-inclusive
cache scenarios, an attacker again has to focus on the directory
structure rather than the cache itself [61].
d) Eviction Sets: Caches store data in units of cache lines
that can hold 2b bytes each4. Caches are divided into 2s sets,
each capable of holding w cache lines. w is called the way-
ness or associativity of the cache. An eviction set is a set of
congruent cache line addresses capable of filling a whole cache
set. Two cache lines are considered congruent if they belong
to the same cache set. Memory addresses are mapped to cache
sets depending on the s bits of the physical memory address
directly following the b cache line offset bits, which are the
least significant bits. Additionally, some caches are divided
into n slices, where n is the number of CPU cores. In the
presence of slices, each slice has 2s sets with w ways each.
Previous work has reverse-engineered the mapping of physical
address bits to cache slices on some Intel processors [33]. A
minimal eviction set contains w addresses and therefore fills
an entire cache set when accessed.
B. Rowhammer
DRAM cells discharge over time, and the memory controller
has to refresh the cells to avoid accidental data corruption.
4The most common cache line size on modern desktop and server CPUs
is 64 bytes.
Generally, DRAM cells are laid out in banks and rows, and
each row within a bank has two adjacent rows, one on either
side. In a Rowhammer, memory addresses in the same bank as
the target memory address are accessed in quick succession.
When memory adjacent to the target is accessed repeatedly,
the electrostatic interference generated by the physical process
of accessing the memory can elevate the discharge for bits
stored in the target memory. A “single-sided” Rowhammer
performs accesses to just one of these rows to generate bit
flips in the target row; a “double-sided” Rowhammer performs
accesses to both adjacent rows and is generally more effective
in producing bit flips. Rowhammer relies on the ability to find
blocks of memory accessible to the malicious program (or in
this work, hardware) that are in the same memory bank as a
given target address. The standard way to find these memory
addresses is by exploiting row buffer conflicts as a timing
side-channel [14]. Pessl et al. [47] reverse-engineered the bank
mapping algorithms of several CPU and DRAM configurations
which allows an attacker to deterministically calculate all of
the physical addresses that share the same bank if the chipset
and memory configuration are known.
C. Attacks on FPGA-CPU Systems
Classical power analysis methodologies like Kocher et al’s
differential power analysis [37] have been applied in new
attacks on inter-chip FPGAs [66, 52, 51]. Such integrated and
inter-chip FPGAs are available in various cloud environments
and system-on-chips (SoCs) products. In particular, Zhao et
al. [66] demonstrated how to build an on-chip power monitor
using ring oscillators (ROs) which can be used to attack the
host CPU or other FPGA tenants. In multi-tenant FPGA sce-
narios where partial reconfiguration by two separate security
domains is possible, more powerful attacks become possible.
For instance, the long wires on the FPGA can spy on adjacent
wires using ROs [15, 49, 48]. Ramesh et al. [49] exploited
the speed of ROs to infer the carried bit in the adjacent wire
and demonstrated a key recovery attack on AES. ROs can also
be used as power wasters to create voltage drop and timing
faults [16, 38]. Note that such attacks rely on FPGA multi-
tenancy which is not widely used yet. In contrast, in this work,
we only assume that the FPGA-CPU memory subsystem is
shared among tenants.
D. RSA-CRT Sign
RSA signatures are computed on raising a plaintext m
to a secret power d modulo N = pq, where p and q
are prime and secret, and N is public [9]. These numbers
must all be quite large for RSA to be secure, which makes
the exponentiation rather slow. However, there is a common
algebraic shortcut for modular exponentiation: the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT), used in many RSA signature
implementations, including in the WolfCrypt implementation
we attack in section VI and in OpenSSL [12]. The basic
form of the RSA-CRT signature algorithm is shown in 1. The
CRT algorithm is equivalent to but much faster than simply
computing md mod N because dp and dq are of order p and
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Algorithm 1 Chinese remainder theorem RSA signature
1: procedure SIGN(m: message, d: private exponent, p:
private factor, q: private factor)
2: Sp ← mdp mod p . equivalent to md mod p
3: Sq ← mdq mod q . equivalent to md mod q
4: Iq ← q−1 mod p . inverse of q
5: return S ← Sq + q ((Sp − Sq)Iq mod p)
6: end procedure
q respectively while d is of order N , which, being the product
of p and q, is significantly greater than p or q; it is around
four times faster [5] to compute the two exponentiations mdp
and mdq than it is to compute md outright.
III. ANALYSIS OF INTEL FPGA-CPU SYSTEMS
This section explains the hardware and software interfaces
that the Intel Arria 10 GX FPGA platforms use to commu-
nicate with their host CPUs and the firmware, drivers, and
architectures that underlay them. We do not attack these sys-
tems directly in this work, but we make extensive use of them,
as they form the most obvious and readily available attack
surfaces between the FPGA platforms and their host CPUs.
An overview of the architecture and hardware connections is
given in Figure 1.
a) A Brief Introduction to Intel Terminology: Intel refers
to a single logical unit implemented in FPGA logic and having
a single interface to the CPU as an Accelerator Functional
Unit (AFU). So far, available FPGA platforms only support
one AFU per Partial Reconfiguration Unit (PRU, also called
the green region). The AFU is an abstraction similar to a
program that captures the logic implemented on an FPGA.
The FPGA Interface Manager (FIM) is part of the non-user-
configurable portion (blue region) of the FPGA and contains
external interfaces like memory and network controllers as
well as the FPGA Interface Unit (FIU), which bridges those
external interfaces with internal interfaces to the AFU.
A. Intel FPGA Platforms
a) Intel Programmable Acceleration Card with Arria 10
FPGA: Intel’s Arria 10 GX Programmable Acceleration Card
(PAC) is a PCIe expansion card for FPGA acceleration [31].
The Arria 10 GX FPGA on the card communicates with its
host processor over a single PCIe Gen3x8 bus. Memory reads
and writes from the FPGA to the CPU’s main memory use
physical addresses; in virtual environments, the PCI controller
on the CPU side implements an IOMMU to translate physical
addresses in the virtual machine (what Intel calls I/O Virtual
Addresses or IOVA) to physical addresses in the host machine.
Alongside the FPGA, the PAC contains 8 GB of DDR4,
128 MB of flash memory, USB for debugging.
b) Intel Xeon Processor with integrated Arria 10 FPGA:
Intel has also begun producing Xeon server processors with
an integrated Arria 10 FPGA in the same package [25]. The
FPGA and CPU are closely connected through two PCIe
Gen3x8 links and an UltraPath Interconnect (UPI) link. UPI is
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Fig. 1: Architectural and hardware overview for Intel FPGAs.
The software part of the Intel Acceleration Stack called OPAE
is highlighted in orange. Its API is used by applications
(yellow) to communicate with the AFU. The green region
marks the part of the FPGA that is re-configurable from
userspace at runtime. The blue region describes the static soft
core of the FPGA. It exposes the CCI-P interface to the AFU.
Intel’s high-speed CPU interconnect replacing the predecessor
QPI in Skylake and later Intel CPU architectures [44]. The
FPGA has a 128 KiB directly mapped cache that is coherent
with the CPU caches over the UPI bus. Like the PCI link on
the PAC, both the PCI links and the UPI link use I/O virtual
addressing, appearing as physical addresses to virtualized
environments. As the UPI link bypasses the PCI controller’s
IOMMU, the FIU implements its IOMMU and Device TLB
to translate physical addresses for reads and writes using
UPI [30].
B. Intel’s FPGA-CPU Compatibility Layers
a) Open Programmable Acceleration Engine (OPAE):
Intel’s latest generations of FPGA products are designed for
use with the OPAE [29] which is part of the Intel Acceleration
Stack. The principle behind OPAE is that it is an open-source,
hardware-flexible software stack designed for interfacing with
FPGAs that use Intel’s Core Cache Interface (CCI-P), a
hardware host interface for AFUs that specifies transaction
requests, header formats, timing, and memory models [30].
Essentially, OPAE provides a software interface for software
developers to interact with a hosted FPGA, while CCI-P pro-
vides a hardware interface for hardware developers to interact
with its host CPU. Assuming it doesn’t use any platform-
specific hardware features, any CCI-P compatible AFU should
be synthesizable (and the result should be logically identical)
for any CCI-P compatible FPGA platform; OPAE is built on
top of hardware- and OS-specific drivers and as such is com-
patible with any system with the appropriate drivers available.
As described below, the OPAE/CCI-P system provides two
main methods for passing data between the host CPU and the
FPGA.
b) Memory-mapped I/O (MMIO): OPAE can send 32-
or 64-bit MMIO requests to the AFU directly or it can map
an AFU’s MMIO space to OS virtual memory [29]. CCI-
P provides an interface for incoming MMIO requests and
outgoing MMIO read responses. The AFU may respond to
read and write requests in any way that the developer desires,
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though an MMIO read request will time out after 65,536 cycles
of the primary FPGA clock. In software, MMIO offsets are
counted as the number of bytes and expected to be multiples
of 4 (or 8, for 64-bit, reads and writes), but in CCI-P, the
last two bits of the address are truncated, because at least 4
bytes are always being read or written. There are 16 available
address bits in CCI-P, meaning that the total available MMIO
space is 216 32-bit words, or 256 KiB [30].
c) Direct memory access (DMA): OPAE can instruct
the OS and kernel to allocate a block of memory that can
be read by the FPGA. There are a few important details
in the way this memory is allocated: most critically, it is
allocated in a contiguous physical address space. The FPGA
will use physical addresses to index the shared memory, so
physical and virtual offsets within the shared memory must
match. The driver provides the physical address of the newly
allocated buffer to the software; the address must be manually
passed to the FPGA. On systems using Intel Virtualization
Technology for Directed I/O (VT-d), which employs the I/O
memory management unit (IOMMU) to provide an I/O Virtual
Address (IOVA) to PCI devices, the memory will be allocated
in continuous IOVA space. Either way, this ensures that the
FPGA will see an accessible and continuous buffer of the
requested size. For buffer sizes up to and including one
standard memory page of 4 kB, a new standard memory page
will be allocated to the calling process by the operating system
and configured to be accessible by the FPGA with its IOVA
or physical address. For buffer sizes greater than 4 kB and up
to 2 MB, the function will call the OS to allocate a 2 MB huge
page. For even greater sizes, the function will ask the OS for
a 1 GB huge page. Keeping the buffer in a single page ensures
that it will be continuously allocated in virtual and physical
memory.
C. Cache and Memory Architecture on the Intel FPGAs
a) FPGA PAC: As well as having access to the CPU’s
memory system, the FPGA PAC has its local RAM, with a
separate address space from that of the CPU and its memory.
The PAC’s RAM is always directly accessed; there is no cache
between it and the FPGA. When the PAC reads from the
CPU’s memory, the CPU’s memory system will serve the
request from its LLC if possible. If the memory is read or
written is not present in the LLC, the request will be served
by the CPU’s main RAM. The PAC is unable to modify the
contents of the LLC with reads or writes.
b) Integrated Arria 10: The integrated Arria 10 FPGA
has access to the host memory. Additionally, it has its 128 kB
cache that is kept coherent with the CPU’s caches over UPI.
Memory requests over PCIe take the same path as requests
issued by an FPGA PAC. If the request is driven over UPI,
the local coherent FPGA cache is checked first before, on a
cache miss, forwarding the request to the CPU’s LLC or main
memory.
An AFU has control over what data is to be cached
locally by adding caching hints to the requests. The available
caching hints are summarized in Table I. For memory reads,
RdLine_I is used to not cache data locally and RdLine_S
to cache data locally in the shared state. For memory writes,
WrLine_I is used to not cache data locally, WrLine_M
leaves written data in the local cache in the modified state,
and WrPush_I does not cache data locally but requests to
cache data in the CPU’s LLC.
The CCI-P documentation [30] lists all caching hints as
available for memory requests over UPI. When running re-
quests over PCI, RdLine_I, WrLine_I, and WrPush_I
can be used while other hints are ignored.
IV. CACHE ATTACKS ON INTEL FPGA-CPU PLATFORMS
We reverse-engineered parts of the memory subsystem and
its behavior on current Arria 10 based FPGA-CPU cloud
systems. In this section, we reveal several leakages that are
exploitable by an AFU- or CPU-based attacker attacking the
CPU or FPGA, respectively. At last, we discuss the viability
of intra-FPGA cache attacks. A summary of all findings of
this section is given in Table II.
To measure memory access latency from the FPGA, we
designed a timer module clocked at 400 MHz. While enabled,
it counts clock cycles and returns the counter value in a register
when disabled.
The advantage of a timer realized in hardware is that it
runs uninterruptible in parallel to all other modules contained
in the AFU. Therefore, the timer precisely counts FPGA clock
cycles, while timers on the CPU, such as rdtsc, may yield
noisier measurements due to interruptions by the operating
system and the CPU’s out-of-order pipeline.
A. Cache Attacks from FPGA PAC to CPU
The Intel PAC has access to one PCIe lane that connects it to
the main memory of the system through the CPU’s LLC. The
CCI-P documentation [30] mentions a timing difference for
memory requests served by the CPU’s LLC and those served
by the main memory. Using our timer module we verified the
suggested latency differences as shown in Figure 2. Accesses
to the LLC take between 139 to 145 cycles; accesses to main
memory take 148 to 158 cycles. Such distinct distributions of
access latency form the basis of cache attacks as they enable
an attacker to tell which part of the memory subsystem served
a particular memory request. Our results show that FPGA
based attackers are capable of precisely distinguishing memory
responses coming from the LLC and those coming from main
memory.
In addition to the probing, some way of influencing the
state of the cache is needed to perform cache attacks. We
investigated all possibilities of cache interaction offered by
the CCI-P interface on an FPGA PAC and found that neither
reading nor writing data from the FPGA PAC measurably
altered the LLC. Therefore, we state that an FPGA PAC
attacker currently5 is not capable of performing cache attacks
against the CPU. However, the negative result for cache attacks
from an FPGA PAC is a positive result for Rowhammer, as
5This may change e.g. if the blue stream gets DDIO capability.
5
TABLE I: Overview of the caching hints configurable over CCI-P on an integrated FPGA. *_I hints invalidate a cache line
in the local cache. Reading with RdLine_S stores the cache line in the shared state. Writing with WrLine_M caches the
line modified state.
Memory Read Memory Write
Cache Hint RdLine_I RdLine_S WrLine_I WrLine_M WrPush_I
Descr. No FPGA caching Leave FPGA cache in
S state
No FPGA caching Leave FPGA cache in
M state
Intent to cache in LLC
Available UPI, PCIe UPI UPI, PCIe UPI UPI, PCIe
TABLE II: Summary of our leakage and cache attacks find-
ings: OPAE accelerates eviction set construction by making
huge pages and physical addresses available to userspace.
Attacker Target Channel Attack
FPGA PAC AFU CPU LLC PCIe –
Integrated FPGA AFU CPU LLC QPI –
Integrated FPGA AFU CPU LLC PCIe P+P
CPU FPGA Cache QPI F+F
Integrated FPGA AFU FPGA Cache CCI-P E+R, P+P
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Fig. 2: Latency for PCIe read requests on an FPGA PAC served
by the CPU’s LLC or main memory.
shown in section V. Also, as we shall see in subsection IV-B,
this negative result does not hold for attackers located on an
integrated Arria 10 FPGA
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Fig. 3: Latency for QPI read requests on an integrated Arria
10 served by the FPGA’s local cache, CPU’s LLC, or main
memory.
B. Cache Attacks from Integrated Arria 10 FPGA to CPU
The integrated Arria 10 has access to two PCIe lanes and
one QPI lane connecting it to the CPU’s memory subsystem
like on an FPGA PAC but with an additional cache on the
FPGA accessible over QPI (cf. subsection III-C).
By timing memory requests from the AFU using our
hardware timer, we show that distinct delays for the different
levels of the memory subsystem exist. Both PCIe lanes show
similar delays as measured on an FPGA PAC (cf. Figure 2).
Our memory access latency measurements for the QPI lane,
depicted in Figure 3, show an additional peak for requests
being answered by the FPGA’s local cache. Additionally, the
two peaks for LLC and main memory accesses are likely
narrower and further apart than in the PCIe case because
QPI, Intel’s proprietary high-speed processor interconnect, is
an on-chip bus only connecting CPUs and FPGAs. No other
peripherals block the QPI resources, giving even less noisy
timing measurements.
1) Reverse-engineering Caching Hint Behavior: Next, we
reverse-engineered the behavior of the caching hints. The
caching hints RdLine_I and RdLine_S, that are available
for memory read requests, show no effect on the LLC neither
over PCIe nor over QPI. The RdLine_S flag makes the blue
region cache the read data in the FPGA’s local cache and evict
another cache line where necessary if the read requests are
sent over QPI. Setting RdLine_I in a memory request over
QPI makes the blue stream mark the requested cache line as
invalid in the local cache, effectively evicting the cache line,
after answering the memory request.
When writing data, three caching hints are available when
using the QPI lane. The caching hint WrLine_M caches the
cache line before writing to it, leaving the cache line in the
local cache in a modified state. The WrLine_I flag behaves
as a write-back flag, evicting the cache line from the local
cache to main memory. Using WrPush_I writes to a cache
line, evicts it from the FPGA cache and hints the CPU to store
the cache line in its LLC. Because the FPGA’s cache is kept
coherent with the CPU’s LLC, writing to a cache line from
the AFU must result in invalidating the cache line in the LLC
or updating it. For the WrLine_M caching hint, the cache line
must be evicted from the LLC as the cache line is left in the
FPGA cache in a modified state. In the case of WrLine_I,
either invalidating or updating may be true. When WrPush_I
is used, we expect the cache line to be updated in the LLC.
To validate our assumptions, we timed the CPU’s access
to cache lines that were previously written by an AFU with
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one of the three caching hints set. In all three cases, the
access times lie above 325 CPU cycles. On the same system,
a single access to a cache line in main memory takes at least
175 cycles. Therefore, we show that the cache line written to
by the AFU can be evicted from the LLC by exploiting the
coherency protocol. While we expected this behavior when
using WrLine_I and WrLine_M, LLC cache hits should
occur at least occasionally when using the WrPush_I hint.
However, none of our measurements ever showed a cache hit,
letting us assume that WrPush_I is not implemented in our
prototype, even though it is documented.
As documented in [30], caching hints WrLine_I and
WrPush_I are available over PCIe as well. Our measure-
ments show similar behavior, independent of the caching hint.
But in contrast, to slow access times after writes over QPI,
access times show that the CPU’s read requests are served
from LLC, even though WrLine_I is supposed to leave the
cache line in the invalid state. Further investigation revealed
that WrPush_I is indeed ignored by the blue stream but the
CPU handles all PCIe requests as if the caching hint was set.
Therefore, we showed that an attacker located on an integrated
Arria 10, in contrast to an FPGA PAC attacker, is indeed
capable of writing to the CPU’s LLC.
As the CPU decides to cache all write requests over PCIe in
its LLC, we assume a Direct Data I/O (DDIO) like behavior
which gives the AFU access to a reduced number of ways
per cache set. This would reduce the attack surface for a P+P
attack as only parts of a cache set can be primed. However,
attacks against other peripherals, where access to a limited
number of cache ways per set is sufficient, are still possible
as recent results show [39].
2) Constructing a Covert Channel from AFU to CPU:
Independent of which LLC ways are actually writable, the
fact that the AFU can write data to at least one way per cache
slice via PCIe allows us to construct a covert channel from
the AFU to a co-operating process on the CPU using side
effects of the LLC. To do so we designed an AFU that writes
random data to a fixed cache line over PCIe whenever a ‘1’
is transmitted and stays quiet whenever a ‘0’ is sent. In this
way, the AFU sends messages which can be read by the CPU.
For our test setup, we made the message configurable from
the AFU’s software counterpart. For the rest of this section,
we will refer to the address the AFU writes to as the target
address.
The receiver process6 first constructs an eviction set for the
set/slice-pair the target address is in. To find an eviction set,
we run a slightly modified version of Algorithm 1 using Test
1 in [58]. We use the OPAE API to allocate hugepages and
get physical addresses (cf. paragraph III-B0c). Therefore, we
construct the eviction set from a rather small set of candidate
addresses all belonging to the same set.
To ease the eviction set finding, the receiver has access to the
target address via shared memory to have the receiver test its
6This process is not the software process directly communicating with the
AFU over OPAE/CCI-P.
eviction set against the target address directly. This way, we do
not need to explicitly identify the target address’s LLC slice.
In a real-world scenario, either the slice selection function has
to be known [26, 33, 27] or eviction sets for all slices have
to be constructed by seeking conflicting addresses [42, 45].
Having one thread per slice monitoring it prevents the time
penalty.
Next, the receiver primes the LLC with the eviction set
found and probes the set in an endless loop. Whenever the
execution time of a probe is above a certain threshold, the
receiver assumes that the eviction of one of its eviction set
addresses was the result of the AFU writing to the target
address and therefore interprets this as receiving a ‘1’. If
the probe execution time stays below the threshold, a ‘0’ is
detected as no eviction of the eviction set addresses occurred.
An example measurement of the receiver and its decoding
steps are depicted in Figure 4. The AFU sends every bit three
times. This redundancy makes decoding easy at the cost of
a low bandwidth of about 94.984 kBit/s. Throughput can be
increased by sending bits less redundant. Also, multiple cache
sets can be used in parallel to encode several bits at once. The
synchronization problem can be solved by using one cache
set as the clock, where the AFU writes an alternating bit
pattern [55].
In summary, we have three findings for the integrated Arria
10:
– Despite WrPush_I being ignored by the Blue Region,
an AFU can place data in the LLC because the CPU
is configured to handle all PCIe write requests from the
integrated Arria 10 as if WrPush_I is set.
– OPAE exposes physical addresses to the user and sup-
ports eviction set finding by enabling hugepages.
Additionally, we use our findings to establish a covert chan-
nel between the AFU and the CPU with a bandwidth of
94.984 kBit/s.
C. Cache Attacks from CPU to Integrated Arria 10 FPGA
This section investigates the CPU’s capabilities to run cache
attacks against the coherent cache on the integrated Arria
10 FPGA. First, we measured the memory access latency
depending on the location of the address accessed using the
rdtsc instruction. The results in Figure 5a show that the
CPU can clearly distinguish where an accessed address is
located. Therefore, the CPU is capable of probing a memory
address that may or may not be present in the local FPGA
cache. It is interesting to note that requests to main memory
return faster than those going to the FPGA cache. This can
be explained by the much slower clock speed of the FPGA
running at 400 MHz while the CPU operates at 1.2-3.4 GHz.
Another explanation is that our test platform is one of the
prototypes and the coherency protocol implementation of the
blue region is still buggy. As nearly all known cache attack
techniques use somewhat of a probing phase, this capability is
a good step in the direction of having a fully working cache
attack from the CPU against the FPGA cache.
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Fig. 4: Covert channel measurements and decoding. The AFU sends each bit three times, which results in three peaks at the
receiver if a ‘1’ is transmitted (middle plot).
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(b) The flush execution time on the CPU with the flushed
address being absent or present in the FPGA cache.
Fig. 5: Memory access and flush execution latency measured
from a Broadwell CPU with integrated Arria 10.
Besides the capability of probing the FPGA cache, we also
need a way of flushing, priming, or evicting cache lines to
get the FPGA cache in a known state. While the AFU can
control which data is cached locally by using caching hints,
there is no such option documented for the CPU. Therefore, we
cannot prime the FPGA cache to evict cache lines. However,
as the CPU has a clfush instruction, we are capable of
flushing cache lines from the FPGA cache, because the cache
is coherent with the CPU caches.
In total, we can probe and flush cache lines located in
the FPGA cache. This enables us to run a Flush+Reload
attack against the victim AFU where the addresses used by
the AFU get flushed before the execution of the AFU. After
the execution, the attacker then probes all previously flushed
addresses to learn which addresses were used during the AFU
execution.
Another possible cache attack is the more efficient
Flush+Flush. Additionally, we expect the attack to be more
precise as flushing a cache line that is present in the FPGA
cache takes about 500 CPU clock cycles longer than flushing
a cache line that is not (cf. Figure 5b), while the latency
difference between memory and FPGA cache accesses adds
up to only about 50-70 CPU clock cycles.
In general, the applicability of Flush+Reload and
Flush+Flush is limited because the attacker and victim
must share access to a physical memory location. A
reasonable attack scenario that satisfies this requirement
would be a case where two users on the same CPU share an
instantiation of a library that uses an AFU for acceleration
of a process that should remain private, like training a
machine learning model with confidential data or performing
cryptographic operations.
D. Intra-FPGA Cache Side-Channels
As soon as FPGAs support simultaneous multi-tenancy, that
is, the capability to place two AFUs from different users on
the same FPGA at the same time, the possibility of intra-
FPGA cache attacks arises. As the cache on the integrated
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Arria 10 is directly mapped and only 128 kB in size, finding
eviction sets becomes trivial when giving the attacker AFU
access to huge pages. As this is the default behavior of the
OPAE driver when allocating more than one memory page at
once, we assume that it is straightforward to run a successful
Prime+Probe attack against a neighboring AFU to e.g. extract
information about a machine learning model.
V. JACKHAMMER ATTACK
a) Contribution: In this section, we present and evaluate
a simple AFU design for the Arria 10 GX FPGA that is
capable of performing Rowhammer against its host CPU’s
RAM significantly faster and more effectively than its host
CPU can. In a Rowhammer attack, a significant factor in the
speed and efficacy of an attack is the rate at which memory
can be repeatedly accessed. On many systems, the CPU is
sufficiently fast to cause some bit flips, but the FPGA can
repeatedly access its host machine’s memory system substan-
tially faster than the host machine’s CPU can. Ultimately
both the CPU and FPGA share access to the same memory
controller hardware, so we predict that the advantage is in
the drastically simpler architecture of the FPGA’s non-user-
configurable hardware compared to the micro-architecture of
the CPU and in the resulting lack of software and firmware
overhead. Crucially, this also means that it is much more
difficult for a program on the CPU to detect the presence of
an FPGA Rowhammer attack than that of a CPU Rowhammer
attack - the FPGA’s memory accesses leave no trace on the
CPU itself.
A. JackHammer: Our FPGA Implementation of Rowhammer
We now present our design for JackHammer, a rowhammer
AFU for the Arria 10 FPGA. When the AFU is loaded, the
CPU must first use the MMIO interface to set the target
physical addresses that the AFU will repeatedly access. In
a successful rowhammer attack, these two addresses should
be in rows adjacent to the row that will incur bit flips. It is
recommended to set both addresses for a double-sided attack,
but if the second address is set to 0, the AFU will perform a
single-sided attack using just the first address. The CPU must
also use the MMIO interface to set the number of times to
access the targeted addresses.
Finally, the CPU can write a start signal over the MMIO
interface, at which point the AFU begins counting down
through the number of memory accesses and sending them
as fast as it can, alternating between addresses in a double-
sided attack. Note that unlike a software implementation of
Rowhammer, the accessed addresses do not need to be flushed
from cache – DMA requests from the FPGA do not modify
the state of the CPU cache, though if the requested memory
is in the last-level cache, the request will be served to the
FPGA by the cache instead of by memory, and Rowhammer
will not work (see subsection III-C for more details on caching
behavior). In a real attack scenario, the attacker only needs to
ensure that the cache lines containing each of the addresses
are never accessed by the CPU during the attack (or, if for
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Fig. 6: Distributions of hammering rates on FPGA PAC and
i7-3770
some reason the attacker must access them from the CPU,
they should be flushed immediately so that the attack will
only briefly be interrupted). The number of times to access
the target addresses can be read again to get the number
of remaining accesses; this is the simplest way to check in
software whether or not the AFU has finished sending these
accesses. When the last read request has been sent by the
AFU (which is not the same as when the read request has
been transmitted from the FPGA to the CPU, or when the
read request is processed by the RAM, or when the response
is returned to the FPGA), the number of accesses remaining
will be zero, and the total amount of time taken to send all of
the requests is recorded.7
B. JackHammer on the FPGA PAC vs. CPU Rowhammer
Figure 6 shows a box plot of the 0th, 25th, 50th, 75th,
and 100th percentile of measured “hammering rates” for
the Arria 10 FPGA PAC and its host i7-3770 CPU. Each
measurement in these distributions is the average hammering
rate over a run of 2 billion memory requests. Our JackHammer
implementation is substantially faster than the standard CPU
rowhammer, and its speed is far more consistent than the
CPU’s. The FPGA can manage an average throughput of
one memory request, or “hammer,” every ten 200 MHz FPGA
clock cycles (finishing 2 billion hammers in an average of
103.25 seconds); the CPU averages one hammer every 311
3.4 GHz CPU clock cycles (finishing 2 billion hammers in an
average of 183.41 seconds). Here we can see that even if the
FPGA were clocked higher, it would still spend most of its
time waiting for entries in the PCIe transaction buffer in the
non-reconfigurable region to become available.
Figure 7 shows measured bit flip rates in the victim row for
the same experiment.
Runs where zero flips occurred during hardware or software
hammering were excluded from the flip rate distributions, as
7The time to send all the requests is not precisely the time to complete
all the requests, but it is very close for sufficiently high numbers of requests.
The FPGA has a transaction buffer that holds up to 64 transactions after
they have been sent by the AFU. The buffer does take some time to clear,
but rowhammer is rather ineffective unless at least millions of requests in
total are being sent, so this additional time is negligible for the performance
measurements we recorded.
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Fig. 8: Distributions of total flips after varying numbers of
hammers on FPGA PAC
they are assumed to correspond with sets of rows that are in the
same logical bank, but not directly adjacent to each other. The
increased hammering speed of the FPGA Rowhammer imple-
mentation produces a more than proportional increase in flip
rate, which is unsurprising due to the highly physical nature of
the rowhammer exploit. As the rowhammer attack is underway,
electrical charge is drained from capacitors in the victim row.
However, the memory controller is also periodically refreshing
the charge in the capacitors. When there are more memory
accesses to adjacent rows within each refresh window, there
is a higher likelihood that any one bit will be misread on
the next refresh and therefore reset to a faulty value. This
is why the FPGA’s increased memory throughput makes for
such a significantly more effective rowhammer attack against
the same DRAM chip.
Another way to look at hammering performance is by
counting the total number of flips produced by a given number
of hammers. Figure 8 and Figure 9 show minimum, maximum,
and every 10th percentile of the number of flips produced by
the AFU and CPU respectively for a range of total number of
hammers from 200 million to 2 billion.
These graphs demonstrate how much more effectively the
FPGA PAC can generate bit flips in the RAM even after the
same number of memory accesses. For hammering attempts
that resulted in a non-zero number of bit flips, the AFU
exhibits a wide distribution of flip count in the range of 200
million to 800 million hammers which then rapidly narrows in
the range of 800 million to 1.2 billion and finally levels out by
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Fig. 10: Time series plotting number of flips on a row-by-
row basis, showing the consistent placement of small-valued
outliers relative to their much larger neighbors
1.8 billion hammers. This set of distributions seems to indicate
that “flippable” rows will ultimately reach about 80-120 total
flips after enough hammering, but it can take anywhere from
200 million hammers (about 10 seconds) to 2 billion hammers
(about 100 seconds) to reach that limit.
There are also a few rows that only incur a few flips.
These samples appear in a consistent pattern demonstrated in
Figure 10, which plots a portion of the data used to create
Figure 8 in detail. Each impulse in this plot represents the
number of flips after a single run of 2 billion hammers on
a particular target row. In Figure 10, at indices 23 and 36,
two of these outliers are visible, each appearing two indices
after several samples in the standard 80-120 flip range. These
outliers could indicate rows that are affected vary slightly by
hammering on rows that are nearby but not adjacent.
C. JackHammer on the Integrated Arria 10 vs. CPU Rowham-
mer
The JackHammer AFU we designed for the integrated
platform is the same as the AFU for the PAC, except that
the integrated platform has access to more physical channels
for the memory reads. The PAC only has a single PCIe
channel; the integrated platform has one UPI channel and two
PCIe channels, as well as an “automatic” setting which lets
the interface manager select a physical channel automatically.
Therefore we present the hammering rates on this platform
with two different settings - alternating PCIe lanes on each
access and using the automatic setting.
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However, this platform is only available to us on Intel’s
servers, so we have only been able to test on one RAM setup
and have been unable to get this RAM to flip.8 The integrated
Arria 10 platform shares its chip with a modified Xeon v4-
style CPU and, on the servers available to us, it is installed
on an X99 series motherboard with 64 GB of DDR4 RAM.
Figure 11 shows distributions of measured hammering rates
on the integrated Arria 10 platform. Compared to the Arria 10
PAC, the integrated Arria 10’s hammering rate is more varied,
but with a similar mean rate.
1) The Effect of Caching on Rowhammer Performance: A
primary reason for the difference in hammering performance
between JackHammer on the FPGAs and a typical rowhammer
implementation on the CPUs is that when one of the FPGAs
reads a line of memory from RAM, it is not cached, so the
next read will miss the cache and be directed to the RAM
as well. On the other hand, when the CPUs access a line of
memory, it is cached, and the memory line must be flushed
from cache before the next read is issued, or the next read
8There are several reasons why this could be the case. Some RAM is simply
more physically resistant to flipping by its physical nature. DDR4 memory,
which can be found in this system, sometimes has hardware features to block
Rowhammer style attacks [4]; though some methods have been developed to
circumvent these protections [19], these methods ultimately still rely on the
ability of the attacker to access the DRAM very many times very quickly,
so we consider those methods outside of the scope of this research, which
is focused on the relative ability of the FPGA platforms to quickly access
DRAM.
will hit the cache instead of RAM, and the physical row in
the RAM will not be “hammered.”
We show that caching is the primary factor in the perfor-
mance disparity we observed between FPGA- and CPU-based
Rowhammer, we used the PTEditor [53] kernel module to
set allocated pages as uncachable before testing hammering
performance. We edited the setup of the rowhammer per-
formance tests to allocate many 4 kB pages and set all of
those as uncachable instead of one 2 MB huge page, as the
kernel module we used to set the pages as uncachable was not
correctly configuring the huge pages as uncachable. However,
it is still easy to find a large continuous range of physical
addresses - when these pages are allocated by OPAE, the
physical address is directly available to the software. So the
software simply allocates thousands of 4 kB pages, sorts them,
and then finds the biggest continuous range within them and
attempts to find colliding row addresses within that range. The
JackHammer AFU required no modifications; the assembly
code to hammer from the CPU was edited to not flush the
memory after reading it.
We were unable to compile the PTEditor kernel module to
set the memory as uncachable on the i7-3770 system, so the
FPGA PAC was moved to a Dell Poweredge R720 system with
a Xeon E5-2670 v2 CPU fixed to a clock speed of 2500 MHz
and two 4 GB DIMMs of DDR3 DRAM clocked at 1600 MHz.
Figure 12 shows the performance of the FPGA PAC and this
system’s CPU with caching enabled and disabled. Disabling
caching produces a significant speedup in hammering for both
the PAC and the CPU, but especially for the CPU, which saw a
188% performance increase. With caching enabled, the median
hammering rate of the PAC was more than twice that of the
CPU, but with caching disabled, the median hammering rate
of the PAC was only 22% faster than that of the CPU. Of
course, memory accesses on modern systems are extremely
complex (even with caching disabled), so there are likely
some factors affecting the changes in hammering rate that
we cannot describe, but it seems that removing the need
for the CPU to flush the memory that it is hammering has
brought its performance much closer to that of the PAC, as
we hypothesized.
VI. FAULT ATTACK ON RSA USING JACKHAMMER
In this section, we demonstrate the practical possibility
of a fault injection Rowhammer from an Arria 10 platform
to the WolfCrypt RSA implementation running on its host
CPU. Many Rowhammer-based attacks leverage fault injec-
tions to exploit cryptographic schemes [7, 8] or gain root
privileges [19, 57, 54]. In the RSA fault injection attack first
proved by [9], an intermediate value in the Chinese remainder
theorem modular exponentiation algorithm is faulted, causing
an invalid signature to be produced. We attack the WolfCrypt
RSA implementation in the style of [9]’s attack with both the
Arria 10 FPGA and its host CPU, and find that the attack is
impractically slow on the CPU and all but unable to cause a
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fault in a reasonable time window, but the increased hammer-
ing speed and flip rate of the Arria 10 FPGA makes the attack
possible in the time frame of about 9 RSA signatures.
Figure 13 shows the high-level operation of our attack: the
WolfCrypt RSA application runs on one core, while a mali-
cious application runs adjacent to it, assisting the Rowhammer
AFU on the FPGA in setting up the attack. The Rowhammer
AFU causes a hardware fault in the main memory, and when
the WolfCrypt application reads the faulty memory, it produces
a faulty signature and leaks the private factors used in the RSA
scheme.
A. RSA Fault Injection Attacks
In general, a fault injection attack is an attack where a hard-
ware fault is intentionally caused in such a way that security
of some sort is compromised. In this section, we implement
a fault injection attack against the Chinese remainder theorem
implementation of the RSA algorithm, commonly known as
the Bellcore attack [9]. 1 shows a normally functioning Chi-
nese remainder theorem (CRT) RSA signing scheme where the
signature S is computed by raising a message m to the private
exponent dth power, modulo N . dp and dq , are precomputed
as d mod p−1 and d mod q−1, where p and q are the prime
factors of N [5]. When one of the intermediates Sq or Sp is
computed incorrectly, an interesting case arises. Consider the
difference between a correctly computed signature S and an
incorrectly computed signature S′, computed with an invalid
intermediate S′p. The difference S − S′ leaves a factor of q
times the difference Sp−S′p, so the GCD of S−S′ and N is
the other factor p [5]. This reduces the problem of factoring N
into p and q by brute force to a simple subtraction and GCD
operation, so the private factors (p, q) are effectively broken
if the attacker has just one valid signature S and one faulty
signature S′. The same factor can be recovered with just the
one faulty signature if the message m and public key e are
known; it is also equal to the GCD of S′e −m and N .
a) Fault Injection Attack with RSA Base Blinding: A
common modification to any RSA scheme is the addition of
base blinding, effective against simple and differential power
analysis side-channel attacks, but vulnerable to a correlational
power analysis attack demonstrated by [59]. Base blinding
is used by default in the WolfCrypt RSA-CRT signature
scheme which we attack. In this blinding process shown in
2, the hash of message is multiplied by a randomly generated
number before it is encrypted by the private key. The resulting
signature must then be multiplied by the encryption of the
inverse of the random number to generate a valid signature,
as shown in 3.
This blinding scheme does not prevent the Bellcore fault
injection attack from working. Consider a valid signature
blinded with random factor r1 and an invalid signature blinded
with r2. When the faulty signature is subtracted by the valid
signature, the valid and blinded intermediates Spb are each
unblinded and cancel as before, as shown in Equation 1.
S − S′ = [Sqb + q · (Spb − Sqb) · q−1 mod p] · r−11 mod N
− [Sqb + q · (S′pb − Sqb) · q−1 mod p] · r−12 mod N
= q · [(Spb · q−1 mod p) · r−11
− (S′pb · q−1 mod p) · r−12 ] mod N
(1)
So ultimately, there is still a factor of q in the the difference
S − S′ which can be extracted with a GCD as before.
B. Our Attack
a) Approach and Justification: We developed a simpli-
fied attack model to test the effectiveness of the Arria 10
Rowhammer in a fault injection scenario. Our model simplifies
the setup of the attack so that we can efficiently measure the
performance of both CPU rowhammer and our JackHammer
implementation. We sign the same message with the same
key repeatedly while the Rowhammer exploit runs, and count
the number of correct signatures until a faulty signature is
generated, leaking the key used for signing.
b) Our Attack Setup: In summary, our simplified attack
model works as follows: there is one program that runs the
“victim” and “attacker,” as well as controlling the JackHammer
AFU. It first allocates a large block of memory and checks
it for conflicting row addresses. It then quickly tests which
of those rows can be faulted with hammering. Each row is
hammered with 1,000,000 memory accesses 10 times and the
total number of flips across the 10 runs is added up within
each of the sixty-four 1024-bit possible targets for the attack,
for example:
5. Target: 0x7fb1b646c000
Offset 0x *0 *1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6 *7 *8 *9 *A *B *C *D *E *F
0* 4 14 9 0 7 7 7 17 11 0 26 0 0 0 0 31
1* 9 18 17 18 0 0 0 9 0 14 18 38 8 10 18 0
2* 0 0 27 0 13 0 10 0 0 0 0 14 17 24 3 24
3* 10 8 8 7 30 18 10 8 17 0 7 18 8 10 48 18
One of the typical complications of a Rowhammer fault
injection attack is ensuring that the victim’s data is located in a
row that can be hammered. In our simplified model, we choose
the location of the victim data manually by row number within
the set of continuous rows and offset within the row so that
we may easily test the effectiveness of the attack at various
rows and various locations. In a real attack, the location of
the victim program’s memory can be controlled by the attacker
with a technique known as page spraying [54], which is simply
allocating a large number of pages and then deallocating a
select few, filling the memory in an attempt to cause the
victim program to allocate the right pages. Improvements in
this process can be made; for example,[7] demonstrated how
cache timing side-channels can be used to gather information
about the physical addresses of data being used by the victim
process.
After our simplified model selects a target row, it instructs
the Rowhammer AFU to begin hammering at the adjacent
rows. Then, in the “victim” program, the targeted data (the
precomputed intermediate value d mod q−1) is copied to the
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Fig. 13: WolfCrypt RSA Fault Injection Attack
Algorithm 2 RSA Base-Blinding Used in WolfCrypt
1: procedure BLIND(m, e) . m: the message to be blinded; e: the public key matching the private key that will be used to
sign the message
2: r ← randint(1, n) . n = RSA modulus
3: ri ← r−‘ mod n . The inverse of r ri will be used for unblinding
4: mb ← m · re mod n
5: return mb . mb is the “blinded” version of the message which is encrypted to create a signature
6: end procedure
Algorithm 3 RSA Deblinding Used in WolfCrypt
1: procedure DEBLIND(sb, ri) . sb: the blinded signature, equal to (mre)d mod n = mdr mod n; ri: the inverse of the
random blinding factor, computed in 2
2: s← s · ri mod n . s · ri mod n = mdr · r−1 mod n
3: return s . s is the regular, unblinded signature
4: end procedure
target address selected by the “attacker.” The “victim” then
enters a loop where it reads back the data from the target row
and uses it as part of an RSA key to create a signature from
a sample message. However, when the memory is read back
from the target address, the attack cannot work if the target
address’s data is still cached, because the value will be read
from the non-faulty cache instead of from DRAM, where any
faults will occur. In a real attack, the attacker typically uses
an eviction set to evict the targeted memory from cache. For
more discussion of eviction sets in the context of this paper,
see section IV. For our simplified model, we simply open a
new thread which directly flushes the targeted cache lines on
a given time interval. As we show below, the performance of
the attack depends significantly on the time interval between
flushes.
C. Performance of the Attack
In this section, we show that our JackHammer implemen-
tation with optimal settings can cause a faulty signature an
average of 17% faster than a typical CPU-based, software-
driven rowhammer implementation with optimal settings. In
some scenarios, the performance is as much as 4.8 times that of
the software implementation. However, under some conditions,
the software implementation can be more likely to cause a fault
over a longer period of time.
The performance of this fault injection attack is highly de-
pendent on the time interval between evictions, and as such we
present all of our results in this section as functions of the evic-
tion interval. Each eviction triggers a subsequent reload from
memory when the key is read for the next signature, which
refreshes the capacitors in the DRAM. Whenever DRAM
capacitors are refreshed, any accumulated voltage error in each
capacitor (due to Rowhammer or any other physical effect) is
either solidified as a new faulty bit value or reset to a safe
and correct value. Too short of an interval between evictions
will cause the DRAM capacitors to be refreshed too quickly
to be flipped with a high probability. On the other hand,
however, longer intervals can mean the attack is waiting to
evict the memory for a longer time while a bit flip has already
occurred. It is crucial to note, also, that DRAM capacitors
are automatically refreshed by the memory controller on a
64 ms interval9 [20]. On some systems, this interval is
configurable: faster refresh rates reduce the rate of memory
errors, including those induced by Rowhammer, but they can
impede maximum performance because the memory spends
more time doing maintenance refreshes rather than serving
read and write request. For more discussion on modifying row
9 More specifically, DDR3 and DDR4 specifications indicate 64 ms as the
maximum allowable time between DRAM row refreshes.
13
16 32 48 64 96
Eviction latency (ms)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
M
ea
n 
si
gn
at
ur
es
 to
 fa
ul
t Hardware
Software
Fig. 14: Mean number of signatures to fault at various eviction
intervals
refresh rates as a defense against rowhammer, see section VII.
In table Table III we present two metrics with which we
compare JackHammer and a standard CPU rowhammer im-
plementation. This table shows the mean number of signatures
until a faulty signature is produced and the ultimate probability
of success of an attack within 1000 signatures against a ran-
dom key in a randomly selected chunk of memory within a row
known to be vulnerable to rowhammer. Figure 14 highlights
the mean number of signatures until a faulty signature for the
16 ms to 96 ms range of eviction latency. With an eviction
interval of 96 ms, the JackHammer attack achieves the lowest
average number of signatures before a fault, at only 58, 25%
faster than the best performance of the CPU rowhammer
attack. The CPU attack is impeded significantly by shorter
eviction latency, while the JackHammer implementation is
not, indicating that on systems where the DRAM row refresh
rate has been increased to protect against memory faults and
rowhammer attacks, JackHammer likely offers substantially
improved attack performance.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
a) Detection Using Hardware Monitoring: Micro-
architectural side-channel attacks against CPUs leave traces
in hardware performance counters (HPCs) such as cache hit
and miss counters. Previous works have paired these HPCs
with advanced machine learning techniques to implement real-
time detectors for micro-architectural attacks [10, 13, 64, 23].
Gu¨lmezog˘lu et al.’s FortuneTeller [23] showed that an un-
supervised machine learning model can reliably detect many
types of side-channel attacks including several cache attacks
and Rowhammer. While such performance counters do not
exist in the same form on the Arria 10 GX platforms, they
could be implemented by the FIM. The FIM can monitor
memory accesses and mark it as a cache hit or miss, or the
CPU performance counters can be used in some scenarios. We,
therefore, expect that a well-designed detection system could
thwart many side-channel attacks on the FPGA-CPU interface.
b) Cache Partitioning and Pinning: Many different ap-
proaches for cache partitioning mechanisms are proposed
to protect CPUs against cache attacks. Some are imple-
mentable in software [35, 63, 67, 36] while others require
hardware support [41, 17, 18]. When trying to protect FPGA
caches against cache attacks, especially the hardware-based
approaches should be taken into account. For example, the
FIM could partition the cache into several parts, such that
each AFU can only use a subset of the cache lines in the
local cache. Another approach would introduce an additional
flag to the CCI-P interface telling the local caching agent
which cache lines to pin to the cache.
c) Increasing DRAM Row Refresh Rate: A standard
defense against rowhammer attacks is increasing the rate at
which DRAM is refreshed. DDR3 and DDR4 specifications
require that each row is refreshed at least every 64 ms, but
many systems can be configured to refresh each row every
32 or 16 ms for better memory stability. When we measured
the performance of our fault injection attack in section VI,
we measured the performance with varying intervals between
evictions of the targeted data, simulating equivalent intervals
in row refresh rate, since each eviction causes a subsequent
row refresh when the memory is read by the victim program.
Table III shows that under 1% of attempted Rowhammer
attacks from both CPU and FPGA were successful with an
eviction interval of 32 ms, compared to 14% of CPU attacks
and 26% of FPGA attacks with an interval of 64 ms, suggest-
ing that increasing the row refresh rate would significantly
impede even the more powerful FPGA Rowhammer attack. A
thorough attack could likely still find some vulnerable memory
locations on this system, but this defense could give a victim
valuable time to detect an attack before a fault occurs.
d) Disabling Hugepages and Virtualizing AFU Address
Space: Intel is aware of the fact that making physical ad-
dresses available to userspace through OPAE is a bad idea as a
note on the documentation [29] of the fpgaGetIOAddress
function shows. Additionally to exposing physical addresses,
OPAE makes heavy use of hugepages to ensure physical
address continuity of buffers shared with the AFU. However,
it is well known that disabling hugepages increases the barrier
of finding eviction sets [32, 42] which in turn makes cache
attacks more difficult. We suggest disabling OPAE’s usage
of hugepages. To do so, the AFU address space has to be
virtualized no matter whether the AFU is attached to a virtual
machine or the host itself.
e) Protection against Bellcore Fault Attack: Defenses
against fault injection attacks proposed in the original Bellcore
whitepaper [9] include verifying the signature before releas-
ing it (simple but inefficient for performance), and random
padding of the message before signing, which ensures that no
unique message is ever signed twice and that the exact plain-
text of a faulty signature cannot be determined. For example,
OpenSSL uses padding, but it is PKCS #1 padding, which is
deterministic and therefore useless against the Bellcore attack.
OpenSSL protects against the Bellcore attack by verifying the
signature with its plaintext and public key and recomputing
the exponentiation by a slower but safer single exponentiation
instead of by the CRT if it does not [12]. This is safe against
the traditional Bellcore fault attack, but [12] demonstrated
two other fault injections against the RSA-CRT scheme that
are not prevented by this error checking method. After we
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TABLE III: Performance of our JackHammer exploit compared to a standard software CPU rowhammer with various eviction
intervals.
Eviction Mean signatures to fault Successful fault rate
Interval CPU JackHammer % Inc. Speed CPU JackHammer % Inc. Rate
16 280 186 51% 0.4% 0.2% -46%
32 627 219 185% 0.2% 0.8% 264%
48 273 124 120% 14% 19% 39%
64 81 76 7% 17% 26% 56%
96 74 58 27% 46% 49% 8%
128 73 70 4% 52% 50% -1.2%
256 106 115 -7% 57% 55% -3%
Best performance 73 58 25% 57% 55% -3%
reported the vulnerability in WolfSSL discovered in this paper,
version 4.3.0 of WolfSSL was updated to include a signature
verification to protect against Bellcore-style fault injection
attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we show that modern FPGA-CPU hybrid
systems can be more vulnerable to well-known hardware
attacks that are traditionally seen on CPU-only systems. We
show that the shared cache systems of the Arria 10 GX and its
host CPU present possible CPU to FPGA, FPGA to CPU, and
FPGA to FPGA attack vectors. For Rowhammer, we show
that the Arria 10 GX is capable of causing more DRAM
faults in less time than modern CPUs. Our research indicates
that defense against hardware side-channels is just as essential
for modern FPGA systems as it is for modern CPUs. Of
course, the security of any device physically installed in a
system, like a network card or graphics card, is important,
but FPGAs present additional security challenges due to their
inherently flexible nature. From a security perspective, a user-
configurable FPGA on a cloud system needs to be treated with
at least as much care and caution as a user-controlled CPU
thread, as it can exploit many of the same vulnerabilities.
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